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A BSTRACT
This article analyzes the 1999 decision of the United
States Supreme Court, Sutton v. United Air Lines, by asking four
questions and showing how the majority of the Court answered
them. It then sets out the significance for people wit>, disabilities,
including especiallv students covered by the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Educatiorn Act. and the
antidiscrirmination provisions (Section 504) of the Rehabilitation Act,
it also sets out the implications of the decision for special and
generai educators as they engage in Individualized Education
Program planning with students and their parents,
INTRODUCTION: FOUR QUESTIONS
C ONSIDER FOUR QUESTIONS: FIRST. WH(O IS "DIS-
abled"? That's ani old question, one that is fraught with philo-
sophical, policv, and service-provision implications. Second,
what does a person with a disability owe to society, and what
does society owe to the person? That's another old question,
raising concerns regarding the nature of the social contract
and requiring us to revisit Rousseau and other Enlightenment
philosophers. Third, what obligations, if any, does the person
with a disability have to take initiative to blunt the effects of
the disability? Again, another old question, subsumed under
the social contract theory but sharpened by the technologies
that progressively assist the person to mitigate the effects of
the disability. Fourth, what kind of civil rights protections can
people with disabilities expect from law anid society today?
That's a very current and controversial question.
What does the United States Supreme Court have to say
in answer to these four questions? As one of the nation's three
most powerful policy-making bodies (the president and Con-
gress being the other two), the relevant views of a majority of
the Court certainlv warrant our attention. Those views are
accessible in Sitton v. United Air Lines (1999).
THE SUTrON CASE: FACTS, ISSUES,
HOLDING, AND RATIONALE
The Facts
In Siitton, two twins. Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton,
sued United Air Lines when the company refused to offer
themr positions as commercial airline pilots. The company was
entirely candid about its reasons: Neither Karen nor Kim-
berly met the company's minimum vision requirement, which
was uncorrected visual acuity of 20/1 00 or better (Sutton2, p. 476 ).
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The twins' suit rested on the provisions of the Americans
with D.Dsabilities Act (ADA. 1990" that prohibit discrimina-
tion in employment against '6otherwise qualified" individuals
with a disability. Specifically. the t'wins alleged that United
Air Lines had discriminated against them on the basis of their
disability or because it "regarded" them "as having a disabii-
ity sSutwon. p. 4761.
ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against
qualified individuals with a disability because of the person's
disability (§ 12 1. 1 (a n . It defines discahitiv as "a physical or
mental impairment that subsiantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individualh and it protects a
person who has such a disability. has a record of such an im-
pairnment. or is regarded as having such an impairment if
the person, with or wx ithouLt reasonable accommodations. can.
in spite of the disability, perform the essential functions of
the position that the person seeks or already has (ADA.
§ 121102CR') Sutton, p. 476).
The twins' disability was "severe m)opia"; each twin
had uncorrected visuai acuitv of 20!200 or worse in the right
eve and 20/400 or worse in the left eve. With the use of cor-
rective lenses. however. each had vision of 20/20 or better.
Without corrective lenses, neither could "effectively ... see
to conduct numnerous activities such as driving a vehicle.
watching television, or shopping in public stores" aSuctton.
p. 475'). but with corrective measures, such as glasses or con-
tact lenses, each functioned "identically to individuals with-
out a similar impairment" ISftiton. p. 475).
The issues
On its face, then, the main issue in Siuttoni was whether ADA
protects the twins: are they 'otherwise qualified" individual
beneficiaries of the statute and. as such. entitled to not be dis-
criminated against because of their visual impairments?
Immediatelv below that issue clearly lay another:
'xshether disabiitiy is to be> determined with or without refer-
ence to corrective measures" 1 Siteron. p.48 AXi. Is a person who
also can mitigate the effect of the disabilitv by various tech-
nologies or other measures protected?
The Court's Holding
The Court held that ADA does not protect an individual with
an impairnent who can mitigate the effects of the disability:
Looking at the Act IADAt as a whole. it is appar-
ent that if a person is takina measures to correct
for, or mitigate, a phvsical or mental impairment.
the effects of those measures-both positive and
negative-must be taken into account whhen judg-
ing wheEher that person is "substantially limited"
in a major life activity and thus "disabled" under
the Act. (Sutton. p. 482)
The Court's Rationale
The Court stated three reasons to support its conclusion.
First. ADA defines disabilin- as an impairment that "substan-
tia'iv limits" an individual's functioning in a major life activ-
ity. In an approach that can be regarded as Clintonesque
,What is the meaning of "is"?), the Court parsed ADA and
rested its decision (in part) on a verb tense:
Because the phrase "substantially limits" appears
in the Act in the present indicative verb form. we
think the language is properly read as requiring
that a person be presently-not potentially or
hypothetically-substantially limited in order to
demonstrate a disability. A "disability" exists only
where an impairment "substantially limits" a
major life activity. not where it "might." "could,"
or "would'" be substantially limiting if mitigating
measures were not taken. (Sution, p. 482)
What bears noting is that just as some were especially
critical of President Clinton for his lawyer-like defense in the
Lewinsky matter (where the meaning of "is" was part of his
defense), so the same and perhaps others seem warranted in
faulting the Court for its similar reliance on the active verb
tense in interpreting ADA.
Second. ADA requires an "individualized inquiry" whose
purpose is to determine the effect of the impairment on the
person's functioning. The issue is the present effect of an
impairment on a person's functioning. not whether the condi-
tion that the person has automatically entitles the person to
protection under ADA. Thus, in the case in which a dentist
refused to treat a patient other than in a hospital operating
room solely because the patient had I-lI, the issue was not
whether HIV itself is per se a disabilitv unlder ADA but whether
the dentist's decision constituted discrimination based on the
effect of the HI-V on the patient and the risk that the dentist
may or may not be required to assumne in treating the patient
in or outside of the operating room (Bragdon v. Abbott. 1998).
Accordingly, in determining whether an individual qual-
ifies for ADA protection, a court or an ernployer must be able
to consider any positive or negative side effects "suffered by
an individual resulting from the use of mitigating measures,
even when those tnegative) side effects are very severe" (Sir-
ton. p. 484). Simplv put, the individual, and only the particu-
lar individual., has a claimn to ADA. protection; merely having
a condition (such as HIV or severe myopia) does not qualify
the person for ADA protection, for ADA does not protect
"members of a group of people with similar impairments"
(Sutron, p. 508).
Third. ADA's legislative history requires the Court to
conclude that Congress did not intend to protect "all those
whose uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities" (Su.tton,
p. 485). Congress found that 43 million individuals are dis-
abled: if the twins' position were to prevail, that number
would be expanded to include between 100 and 160 million
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individuals (Sutton, p. 485). The figure of 43 million "reflects
an understanding that those whose impairments are largely
corrected by medication or other devices are not 'disabled'
within the meaning of the ADA" (Sutton, p. 486):
Had Congress intended to include all persons with
corrected physical limitations among those cov-
ered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a
much higher number of disabled persons in the
findings [of fact in ADA]. That it did not is evi-
dence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only
those whose impairments are not mitigated by
corrective measures. (Sutton, p. 487)
Having set out the issues in Sutton and the reasons the
Court gave for holding that mitigation displaces a person
from ADA protection, let us now return to the four questions
posed at the beginning of this article.
CLASSIFICATION
Who is "disabled"? Who is a person with a "disability"? In
the view of the majority of the Court, a person with a dis-
ability is an individual who still is unable to function in one
or more of life's major activities despite mitigating the
impairment. Is this a defensible result?
An Illogical Result: Catch-22
Arguably, the result is not defensible. A person (i.e., Karen
Sutton or Kimberly Hinton) has an impairment that limits her
in the work for which she is otherwise (except for the dis-
ability) qualified, so she cannot obtain that work, but she is
not protected under ADA and is unable to use that statute to
challenge an employer's action that is based solely on the
limitation. This seems illogical: The person is disabled from
working at the job she wants, but she is also disabled frorn suing
to remedy an employment decision that is patently based on her
disability. It is a classic double-bind, the Helleresque Catch-22
(If you are crazy, then your request to not fly attack mnissions
will be granted; but if you request to not fly attack missions.
then you are obviously not crazy and must fly those mis-
sions .)
How does the Court's majority answer that double-bind,
catch-22 criticism? What does it say about who is "classified"
into the "disability" group'? Its position is instructive and
simultaneously encouraging but also troubling.
Individualized Inquiries: Due Process and
Professional Practice
Let us begin with the "individualized inquiry" principle.
There is no doubt but that due process requires individualized
inquiries (Bragdonl; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. §
1630.2(j)).
Constitutional principles aside, individualized inquiries
are entirely appropriate as responses to disability. A "meat
ax" approach in which one person with one trait (nature or
type of disability) is treated identically with or similarly to
others with the same or a comparable trait will disfavor some
people with disabilities while simultaneously favoring others.
Thus, if all people with mental illness or developmental dis-
abilities were to be institutionalized (Lessard v. Schmidt,
1974; Parham v. J. R., 1979), treated in the same way or not
treated at all while in the institution (Youngberg I. Romeo,
1982), or discharged from the institution (Olmstead v. L. C..
1999), or if all people with a physical disability were to be
regarded identically and denied certain kinds of benefits-
such as education (Southeastern Conmmunitv College v.
Davis, 1979; Board of Educ. of the Hendrick- Hudson Cent.
Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 1982) or employment (School Bd. of
Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 1987)-the result would benefit some
but not others (Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent.
SchI. Dist. v. Rowley).
The disability advocacy community would not easily
accept this result, which would limit some people while lib-
erating others, nor would professionals, whose interventions
are supposed to be individualized (Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act ILDEAl, 1990: Rehabilitation Act, 1973,
§§ 504, 706(8)). Yet, group rights/claims are the principal ob-
jectives of disability advocacy (so that individuals may assert
their own particular rights/claims) and are the very stuff of
which a new discourse about rights, especially affirmative-
action-based rights, has been carried out for at least the past
2(1 years (Glendon, 199 1:- Ilopwood v. Stte of Texas. 1996;
Minow, 1990).
Paternalism Revisited
Although the individualization principie is laudable, there is
something troubling about it as the Court's majority in Suttoin
expressed it. Referring to the Equal Employment Opportunity
guidelines requiring the determination of disability to be
made in the absence of mitigating measures, the Court said
that the guidelines
could also lead to the anomalous result that in
determining whether an individual is disabled,
courts and employers could not consider any neg-
ative side effects suffered by an individual result-
ing from the use of miti gating measures, even
when those side effects are very severe. (Suttoni,
p. 484)
What seems troubling about this passage is that it smacks of
paternalism-the natural desire of those with public authority
to protect especially vulnerable citizens from harm at the
hands of the state or at the hands of private entities and indi-
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viduals. The Court's language suggeests paternalism because
the Court is explicitlv concerned about negative side effects
that mioht result in the exclusion from ADA's protection of
those who clearly have disabilities. who use mitigating mea-
sures but find that those measures are insufficient to fully cor-
rect the effects of a disability or have, themselves, negative
side effects.
For example, a person with a mental illness may use
medication but find that from time to time the medication
does no, blunt the illness, a person who is battling cancer
might use medication but also find that the medication creates
its own impairnents. Each of these people experiences some
negative side effects of mitications: the fact that they do use
mitigatine measures should not. for that reason alone, ex-
clude them fron ADA's protection. Therefore. it is both right
and paternalistic for the Court to be concerned about these
people. At the same time. however. those w;ho use mitigating
measures but ftind no negative side effects are excluded from
ADA's protection. So, does patemralisn result in limitations'
Apparently so.
This is not a new matter. When the state asylums were
created. they were envisioned as safe havens and even train-
ing schools: their creation was motivated bv altruism and
paternalism (Rubenstein & Levy. 1996'). Yet. asylums became
institutional snake pits and have been the direct objects of
some of the most effective disability advocacy of the past 30
years (Vlyatt v: Srickn e%. 1971: Parham r . 1 R.. 1979).
The lesson is clear ancd familiar. As the philosopher Lionel
Trilling warned about altruism-here, paternalism-those
who are the objects of our pity can become the objects of our
study and then of our limitations (quoted in Rothman, l 98Q0.
Competing Equities
The concerns about paternalisnm that are part of the "effects"
(that is. 'ne-cative side effects"- standard resurface in another
part of the majority's opinion. One of the issues before the
Court was wvhether United Air Lines ti.e.. all current or pros-
pective employers) "regarded" Karen Sutton and Kimberly
Hinton (i.e.. all persons who mitigate their disabilities' ef-
fects) as individuals with a disabilitv. If United did so in vio-
lation of ADA. then the job seekers must not be eliminated
from consideration as comnmercial, airline pilots solely
because they have mitigated their severe myopia.
Consider Ehe position that United and other current or
prospective employers face. If they must not discrimninate
against individuals who have mitigated their disabilities. they
may put their custonmers at great risk. An error by a mvopic
pilot or by a person who sometimes uses or does not regularly
use prescription drugs can lead to passengers' or other con-
sumers' deaths and massive employer liability. Is that an
acceptable result? No: public-safety concerns outweiah indi-
vidual employment claims.
The balancinig of individual versus general interests calls
into play the theory of "competing equities." When interests
or equities compete, it is sometimes justifiable to give an
advantage to some people at the disadvantaZge of others; the
"equities" (claims or interests! of the one outweigh the equi-
ties (claims or interests) of others. When. however, it comes
to public safety. Sutton teaches that the equities favor the gen-
eral, not the individual., interests.
The Court's own precedents make this result clear, and
the precedents that Sutton follows are numerous. For exam-
ple. educators w'ho reject a deaf person from a nursing pro-
gram because they are concerned about patient safety
correctly balance public risk against individual benefit (South-
Castel-n Communit'v College v. Da1vis. 1979). Likewise. den-
tists who refuse to treat HIV-infected patients in their clinics
but instead insist that they will do so only under hospital
operating room conditions are not violating ADA if their
refusal is professionally justified-that is, if the professional
standards (which balance provider safety against patient
interests to "normal" care' tip in their favor (Braagdon.).
Decision Making
The Court in Suttont said that there is a history of discrimina-
tion against people with disabiliEies that is based on "misper-
ceptions" (Sutton. p. 489) and "stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative ... of individual ability" (Siuttot. p. 489.
quoting School BRi. qf'Nassau Crty. v. Arliie . and no doubt
these "accumulated myths and fears about disability and dis-
ease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that
flow from actual impairments" (Suitton. p. 489. quoting Schlool
Bd, of Nassau Ct!v. .
Nonetheless. ADA "a'lows employers to prefer some
phvsical attributes over others and to establish physical crite-
ria" (Sutton, p. 490. citing ADAA. Sec. 12 101):
An employer runs afoul of the ADhA when it
makes an employment decision based on a physi-
cal or mental impairnent, real or imagined, that is
regarded as substantially limiting a major life
activitv. Accordingly, an employer is f-ee to
decide that physical characteristics or medical
conditions that do not rise to the level of an
impairment-such as one's height. build, or
singing voice-are preferable to others, Just as it
is free to decide that some limiting, but not sub-
stan tiallx' limiting., impairments make individ-




The Court adopts an explicitly pro-employer posture. at least
with respect to employees or prospective emplovees. And in
that posture. the Court asserts a capitalistic. laissez-faire doc-
trine: Let everyone compete for work, let the playing field be
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even (thus, no discrimination against the person with a dis-
ability), and let the marketplace determine the outcomes, not
the courts or the federal Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (EEBC).
This result was not unanticipated. In previous disability
cases, the Court had deferred to professional decision making
(Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.; Brag-
don; Olmstead; Parham; Youngberg), and in earlier "affirma-
tive action" cases, the Court had been disinclined to uphold
quota-based or other types of preferences and compensatorv
justice techniques (Wygant v. Jacksoni Bd. of Educ., 1986;
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 1989).
The consequence of these decisions is inherently con-
servative, in the sense that it conserves (i.e., protects) the
institutions within which power has traditionally existed;
when power must be balanced, it will be balanced in favor of
institutions (i.e., employers, educators, other professionals),
not individuals.
Floodgates, Disability Creep, and Damnation
by Data
Another troubling aspect of the Court's classification result
("no disability if mitigated") is that the Court may be as trou-
bled by the "floodgates" prospect as it is by the effect on indi-
viduals. True, the Court nowhere writes about the prospect
that it and lower courts will be overwhelmed by the large
number of ADA lawsuits that they will have to adjudicate if
there are indeed 100 million to 160 million people with dis-
abilities, not the 43 million the Congress identified. But just
because the Court does not say something explicitly does not
mean that it is unconcemed with the matter. Does the Court
sense that disability is a "creeping" phenomenon; that once
unleashed from a narrow definition, the very term disability
may encompass many people who, under a traditional view of
disabilitv, are not truly disabled? That's not a far-fetched con-
clusion. for there is a great difference between 43 million and
100 millioni or 160 million individuals. The impact on an
already overburdened judiciary system of quadrupling the
number of potential ADA claimants cannot be overlooked.
There is an irony here that should not pass unnoticed.
Congress. relying on the data assembled by an independent
government agency-the National Council on Disability
(NCD)-concluded that there are 43 million, and not more,
individuals with disabilities. Indeed, the NCD regarded the
figure of 160 million to be "over inclusive" (Siutto,n, p. 464).
Accordingly, the NCD rejected the "health conditions ap-
proach" that led to that figure, and in doing so, it rejected the
nediecal nmodel that had been at the root of so much patholo-
gizing and disempowering of people with disabilities (Glied-
man & Roth, 1980).
Instead, the NCD, adhering to the more acceptable func-
tional model, adopted a functional approach to defining dis-
ability: A person is classified as having a disability when the
person cannot, even with special aids, perform "certain basic
activities" (Sutton, p. 464). That is, the person cannot func-
tion in a nondisabled way in certain roles and in certain con-
texts. Here, then, is the irony: In rejecting the medical model
and health conditions approach and adopting the functional
model and work disability approach (which is closer to the
productivity and capacity models that are so much part of the
new view of people with disabilities), the NCD, and in turn
Congress, was hoisted with its own petard-or, more accu-
rately, damned by its own data.
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
It is one thing for the Court to adopt a certain economic doc-
trine, and it is another for the Court to extend it and indeed to
invite a challenge to a countervailing doctrine, yet that is just
what the Court did in Sutton.
The Private Contract
If it is a fair reading that the capitalist model prevails, then it
is unsurprising that the Court undergirds that model with a
complementary' view of the social contract. The term social
contract refers to the reciprocal claims that an individual
legitimately makes or may make on society and the claims
that society legitimately makes or may make on the individ-
ual. Just what are those claims?
Under English common law and under contract law as
set out in American courts, an individual does not have a right
to a particular job. Sutton endorses that perspective: An
employer is free to specify the functions related to any job
and thus the qualifications that a job applicant/holder must
have, as long as (a) the employer does not mistakenly believe
that a person has a physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities, or (b) the employer
does not mistakenly believe that an actual, nonlimriting im-
pairment substantially limits one or more major life activities:
In both cases, it is necessary that [an employer]
entertain misperceptions about the individual-it
must believe either that one has a substantially
limiting impairment that one does not have or
that one has a substantially limiting impairment
when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.
(pp. 466467)
The employer's error is making a mistake, yielding to
"stereotypic assumptions" and "myths and fears" (Sutton,
p. 467; ADA. 1990, § 121 017) (. Absent that kind of mistake,
however, the employer is free to hire and fire at will (Satton,
pp. 467-468).
It follows from common law and American contract
law-and from the restatement of that law in Sutton-that the
individual has no claim to a particular job. Consider the facts
in this case: Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton each sought
a particular position, that of "global airline pilot" (Sutton,
pp. 467, 469). This is a single job, and United's refusal to em-
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ploy thenm in that particular, single job was not discrimina-
tory: They were not disabled because they had mitigated their
disabiiitw so United (with respect to nondisabled people) has
the right to decide not only what kinds of functions must be
perfomied in the iob but also what kinds of qualifications a
job seeker must have.
Thus. classification (i.e.. not disabied if mitigated) and
capitalism (i.e.. emplover decision makina is entitied to def-
erencel resulted in the twins not havinog the chance to work at
a particular job. not in their having no chance to work at all:
"Indeed. there are a number of other positions utilizing peti-
tioners' skills. such as regional pilot and pilot instructor, to
name a few. that are available to them" (Sutton. p. 469). The
private contract is clear: A person who has a job to offer inay
offer it to anyone at all (subject to ADA I and may not be coin-
pelled to offer it to a particular person.
The decision-making power is the employer s. not the
individual's. This result is pure original capitalist contract
law: the balance of power favors the employer and disfavors
the iob seeker!job holder. The ermployer is under no legal
obligation to offer a particular job to a particular job seeker.
and the job seeker has no right to have that particular job.
Moreover. if the job seeker is able to work at other jobs.
the person faces a choice: Seek and take that other work if it
is oftered. or remain unemploved. When a person ¢or persons.
in the case of the twinst has mitigated the effects of a dis-
ability, that individual can also mitigate the effects of pros-
pective unemployment by looking for other jobs and taking
the one for which the person is qualified.
The Public Contract
This harkenine back to contract law as it existed long before
the modem "welfare state" reveals something about the social
contract between the person with a disability or alleged dis-
ability and the public. It iS as though the majority of the Court
w.ere giving us all a sermon. speaking the following message:
If the person can work in other jobs. let him or her do so.
Indeed, if the person can do so, the person is not "substan-
tially limited in a major life activity" because work is still
available, even if it is not the work the person wants. The
individual is able to work., so let the person choose to work.
If the person chooses to not work. then let the consequences
fal on the person, not on the employer (who will pass the
costs of a discrimination law judgment along to passengers
and shareholders) or the public (which may have to support
the person through various disability benefit programs).
The majority seems to be saying that just as the Chief
Justice goes to work with a bad back and other Justices work
through their cancer operations or the effects of aging or poor
sight. so the twins and others with mitigated disabilities can
get to work-enough of "victimization" theory This is
America., a capitalist democracy: Let those who can work,
work. And let those who can but choose not to work person-
ally bear the consequences of their choices: let them be
unemployed, if that is what they want. But don't allow them
to pass the costs of unemployment along to "innocent" peo-
ple such as passengers (whom they might harm if hired but
not qualified}. an employer's shareholders (who would have
to absorb the costs of a liability suit brought by passengers or
of an employment-discrimination suit brought by the job
seeker). or taxpayers (who will have to pay the unemploy-
ment benefits to the job seeker and the disability benefits to
injured passengers'.
THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCE
OF OBLIGATIONS
Ancient Doctrine Restated: ADA, IDEA,
and Weffare Reform
What, then, is the nature of the private and public obligations
of a person with an impairment? Under Sutton, it seems to be
this: If barred from a particular job but still able to work, the
person's obligation is to take a job. any job. to be an eco-
nomically self-sufficient, productive member of society.
Putting Surf on aside for just a moment. t is fair to ask
whether that is an altogether unacceptable result. The answer
has to be no. Why? Because ADA and other disability laws
(e.g.. IDEA. Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bi'l
of Rights Act [1963 amended 1987. 1994. 1996. 20001, and
Rehabilitation Act, 1973)' proclaim that the nation's policy
is to enable people with disabilities to be economically self-
sufficient and productive, and because these laws advance
that policy by protecting them against employrment discrimi-
nation and entitling them to education and rehabilitative ser-
vices that can lead to employment.
Thus, it would appear that the majoritv in Sutton? seems
to be saying this: If able to work, the person's obligation is to
work. thereby preventing the cost of unemployment from
being passed along to private and/or public entities. Here. the
majority in Suitton seems to be consistent with the majority of
Congress and even w ith President Clinton who (respectively)
enacted and signed the 1996 Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA e. That
statute placed time limits on public welfare benefits and paid
them (for that limited period of time) only if the welfare
recipient engaged in work or took training that could lead to
work, Under PRWORA, then, society's obligation is time
limited and conditional. By extension., the obligation of the
person. receiving welfare benefits Is to not be a charge on the
public dole, to fiscallv relieve the public of the cost of his or
her life. The majority in Sutton give the same message as
Congress g-ave in PRWORA: If the person can mitigate the
disability, Iet the person do so and thereby mitigate the costs
to the public.
It seems to be a fair reading of Surton that the public's
obligation is limited to those who are truly needy-that is,
"substantially presently unable to work,' even after mitigat-
ing their disability-and the private individual's obligation is
to mitigate the effects of disability and the effects of unem-
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ployment. Have we returned to the old "poor laws" and their
premise that only some people-the undeniably destitute-
are worthy of assistance? The case can be made.
Is this a new social contract? Arguably, no; indeed, it is
rather old. The private employer-employee contract theory
dates to the 17th century; the public support-private individ-
ual contract also is old and is based on the "truly worthy"
views that predated the current "welfare state."
Consequences of the ObligatNon: The Chilling
Effects and the Providers' Duties
The consequences of the Court's reassertion of old doctrines
are manifold. We begin with the consequences for individu-
als themselves and then address the consequences for disabil-
ity policy and practice in general.
The Individual's Choice. One consequence is that a
person faces a Hobbesian choice: If I mitigate my disability,
I may actually function more effectively and have greater
capacity to live the kind of life that I can and should want to
live, but I may also be disqualified from benefits and protec-
tion under various public policies. Here, the choice is be-
tween the prospects of either being less disabled or not
attaining that status on the one hand and between remaining
disabled and receiving the benefits of hard-won and newly
threatened disability policy on the other.
What if the person in fact uses mitigating interventions,
and they result in the person not having a substantial dis-
ability? The person has attained a level of economic self-
sufficiency, productivity, and arguably self-regard/respect
that accompanies those statuses.
But that fact alone may prevent the person from claim-
ing the benefits of ADA; such was the consequence for Karen
Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, and it will be the consequence
for many others like them. Yes, they can still work, but only
in some jobs and capacities, not in the ones thev want. For
them, the "glass ceiling" is permanent-they are limited in
their job prospects, but at least they have jobs.
Moreover, if individuals use mitigating interventions,
they may also lose the benefit of various rights, such as the
right to a free, appropriate public education under IDEA or to
nondiscriminatory education under ADA or Section 504.
They may classify themselves out of a beneficiary class for
not just educational opportunities but also for employment
benefits under the Rehabilitation Act, medical benefits under
the Social Security Act's Medicaid program, or cash transfers
under the Social Security Act's Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI ) or Supplemental Security Income (SST)
programs or the Housing Act's rent subsidy programs.
So, an individual faces two kinds of decisions. First, do
I mitigate and thereby risk the rights and benefits to which I
am otherwise entitled? The answer may well be no, in which
case the Sutton decision will have a chilling effect on the use
of technology by (and on the development of new technology
for) persons with disabilities. Such a result would be unfortu-
nate, for technology-both the human technologies of special
education, speech-language and hearing pathology, occu-
pational and physical therapy, and so forth, and the "hard"
technologies of the computer industry and other industries
involved in manufactured devices-has made a great differ-
ence for people with disabilities and for those who are
impaired because of aging or temporary impairment.
Second, the individual faces a wholly different kind of
choice, one that involves a self-definition, not a matter of
benefits. If I decide to mitigate my disability, I may indeed
reject my image of myself as a person with a disability; I may
become a different person than I have been-one who is now
competent and not one who is limited.
This is not such an easy choice as it seems. On the face
of it, who would not want to be more capable and less dis-
abled? But if the person has learned to be a person with a dis-
ability, and if that trait defines the person and the person's
self-image, associations, and place in society, then mitigation
raises an existential issue: Who am I, who do I want to be,
and what must or may I do to become what I may be?
The Providers' Practices. Given that a person faces
the choice of whether to use mitigating interventions, does
this choice also involve service providers, especially the edu-
cators of students covered or potentially covered by IDEA?
Absolutely.
Under IDEA, a local educational agency is required to
secure the prior consent of a parent of a student (or of the stu-
dent, at age of majority) for an. initial nondiscriminatory eval-
uation (to determine whether the student has a disability and,
if so. what its educational consequences are), for all subse-
quent evaluations, and for any change of placement (into,
within, or out of general or special education or even school;
IDEA, §§ 1414(a)(1)(C). 1414(c)(3)).
As a general rule, consent is valid only if it is "in-
formed." so IDEA requires a local educational agency (LEA)
to disclose to the parent or student information concerning
the action the LEA proposes, an explanation as to why the
LEA reached that decision, a description of any other options
that the LEA considered and why the LEA rejected them, a
description of each evaluation on which the LEA based its
proposed decision, a statement of any other relevant factors,
a statement concerning the parent/student procedural safeguard
rights, and a list of sources the parent/student may contact to
obtain assistance in understanding IDEA rights (§1415(b)(3)).
If the parent/student believes that related services are
needed to enable the student to benefit from special educa-
tion, the parent/student may request them, and the LEA must
furnish them if indeed the services are necessary (IDEA,
§ 1414(c)(l )). Among the related services are "assistive tech-
nologies"-a term that covers devices and services that do
indeed mitigate the effects of disability.
One question is whether an LEA is now, post-Sutton,
required to advise a parent/student of the consequences of using
380 REM F. DIAL AN D SP EC IA L ED U CAT; ON
Vtouhwe 22, ANumber 6, No,ember,December 200i
assistive technology. Arguably. no: IDEA does not specifi-
cally and explicitly require an LEA to inform a parent/student
of those consequences. However. a different argument exists.
one that holds that the LEA is required to provide that kind of
irformation because the consequences will have a bearing on
not onlv the student's rights to an IDEA-based education but
also to any accommodations that the student may clain under
Section 504.
A second question is whjether a person who uses miti-
gatlng nterventions is thereby automatically excluded from
ADA's or IDEA's protections. The answer has to be no. For
example. a person usin; assistive technology nevertheless
may be so impaired as to be substantially limited in a major
life activity. In SuttFoin. the majority of the Court makes that
clear: "The use of a corrective device does not, by itself. re-
lieve one's disability. Rather. one has a disability under sub-
section A if. notwithstanding the use of a corrective device.
that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity"
(p. 4661. Likevise. a person who is using a mitigating inter-
vention such as medication may find that the medicine does
not fulil control the effects of the impairment. that the person
has intermittent periods of substantial limitation despite hav-
ing periods when the mitigation is effective, that the side
effects of a mitigation themiselves substantially limit the per-
son in maior life activities., or that the person has a record or
is regarded as havin- a limitation when in fact the person
does not have one.
The risk-benefit calculation that an individual (parenit.
student, or professional)r must make is now much more coni-
plicated than in the past: whether to mitigate. That fact alone
should cause the U.S. Department of Education, state educa-
tional agencies and LEAs. and courts to interpret IDEA as
requiring disclosure about the mitigation policy and Suttoln.
Moreover, the pressure that an LEA, or other provider
system mav brin_ to bear on the individual is likely to be
increased: Use the mitigating intervention so that you become
more capable, less disabled. and are disqualified from the
expensive benefits that you would receive if Vou did not use
the mitigation. As a matter of pure economics (a basis on
which Suttort is justly analyzed), the schools will see that it is
in their interests, as a matter of controlling the costs of spe-
cial education by reducing the number of students who qual-
ifv as disabled, to urge parents/students to mitigate.
Does that pressure to extrude from the special services
system pose ethical challenges to the providers? Should they
or should they not counsel the use of mitigating interven-
tions? To whom and what do professionals owe their loyal-
ties: the student or the system? These are choices that Sutton
forces educators and other professionals to make.
Civil Rghts, the Court's Invitation, and
an Inchoate Challenge to ADA
Finallv. Surton signaled the Court's verv grave doubts about
the legality of the EEOC regulations/guidelines and even the
constitutionality of ADA. After making it clear that because
the parties to the case accept the validitv of the EEOC regu-
lations. it would not determine their validitv, the Court wbent
on to note that "no agency has been delegated authority to
interpret the term 'disability"' tSutton. p. 460). although the
EEOC has done just that. Indeed. the Court said that "there
may be some conceptual difficulties in defining 'major life
activities' to include work." And it noted that even the EEOC
"has expressed reluctance to define 'major life activities' to
include working" tSUtton, p. 468. on 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630. App.
§ 1630.2t j ) ( t99810. These comments were nothing less than
an invitation .o employers to challenge the very lawvfulness of
the EECC regulations on the grounds of ultra 'ires (beyond
the power of the agency to promulgate).
True, Justice Ginsberg's concurring opinion. which is all
of one paragraph long. notes that "there is no constitutional
dimension' to the case. and the dissents by: Justices Stevens
and Breyer also go to great lengths to point out that the con-
stitutionality of ADA is not at issue here (any more than it
was at issue in Penns lvania Dept. of Corr-ectionls v. Yes key.
1998';.
On the face of the matter. all that is true enough. But
what was really happeninz? In the same spring Ehat the Court
decided Sutton, it also struck down as unconstitutional three
federal statutes on the grounds that Congress lacked author-
itv to enact them (Florida P repaid v. College Savings Banik.
1999, Co!iege Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid. 1999; Al/den
v. Maine. 1999). These three cases directly raised the issue of
the constitutionality of statutes that subjected states to law-
suits. ADA does likewise, subjecting not onlv private employ-
ers (United, in the Suttton, case) but also public employers to
lawsuits if they violate its provisions.
The federalism cases tFlorida Prepaid, College Savings
Bank. and Alden) dealt with federal-state issues a-nd a public
entity: Sutton dealt with private employers. True, Sutton did
not directly raise the question of whether ADA was constitu-
tional. but. it is clear from the Court's decisions in the other
three cases that the majority of the Court had it very much in
mind to restrict federal 'i.e., congressional) authority in
federal-state ti.e.. federalism.) reiations.
Very simply. in Sutton the majority was asking for an
employer to challenge the lawfulness of the EEOC regula-
tions. But there was a complexity to that invitation, in light of
the federalism cases, which suggested that the Court would
welcome a broader challenge to mandated accorrmodations
for individuals with disabilities, one that would strike at con-
gressional authority to abrogate state immunity. Sutton com-
municated the Court's willingness to entertain challenges to
the scope of ADA and the authority behind it: the federalism
cases communicated the form that such challenges should
take.
It came as no surprise, then, that those who oppose ADA
and similar antidiscrimination statutes accepted the Court's
invitation or that the majority of the Court in Sutton, contin-
ued to defederalize the law and to place the Court over Con-
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gress in making laws (hardly a "conservative" position).
Specifically, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents (2000). the
Court struck down the federal statute that outlawed employ-
ment discrimination based on age. And in Board of Trustees
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett et al. (2000), the
Court struck down the provisions of ADA that prohibited
employment discrimination by state govermments. In a five-
to-four decision (with Justice Ginsberg dissenting), the Court
ruled that ADA's legislative history provided insufficient evi-
dence of unconstitutional disability discrimination by states
to support Congress' abrogation of the states' sovereign
immunity under the 11th Amendment.
The question remains as to whether we have seen the
last of the Court's invitations and attacks on ADA. The three
federalism cases were foreboding harbingers of Kimel, and
Kirnel was a precursor to Garrett, just as two of the "gun con-
trol" cases, United States v. Lopez (1995) and Printz v. United
States (1997), telegraphed the Court's desire to review the
constitutionality of all federal laws that regulate state behav-
ior, ADA among them. So, it is fair to read Sutton (and its
invitation to challenge the EEOC regulations) in the same
light as the other federalism cases and to contemplate that
ADA would again be a target in the Court's effort to change
the balance of federal-state relations and the power of Con-
gress to legislate.
CONCLUSION
Sutton is a most alarming case. It addresses the fundamental
issues of classification (i.e., who is disabled); of the social
contract, both in its private and public dimensions, of the
obligations of individuals and professionals; and of the con-
stitutionalitv of the civil rights protection that ADA has
offered to people with disabilities.
The Court has raised for the nation issues that, until Sut-
ton, had not been frontally addressed in the judicial forums of
public policy: Who is disabled, what is the nature of the
social contract, what duties and claims exist among those
with and without disabilities, and what is the scope of Con-
gress' power to address disability (or other trait-based) dis-
crimination?
One would have thought that these issues had been
pretty well resolved as a result of nearly two and a half
decades of disability policymaking (beginning in the early to
mid-1970s). But one would have been wrong to think that. So
the nation faces, yet again, the very issues that challenged it
before the "rights revolution" began.
Should we thank the Court for that intellectual stimulus?
We think not: If the Court is "reading" the pulse of the nation
correctly, or if it is indeed leading the nation's response to
disability and to congressional power to prohibit public and
private discrimination, there soon will be a rollback of rights
long ago sought, recently established, and nowadays only
partially implemented. The new millennium begins with an
antediluvian decision, hardly a welcome prospect. u
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